Globalised rebellion: the Darfur insurgents and the world by Jumbert, Maria Gabrielsen & Lanz, David
Globalised rebellion: the Darfur
insurgents and the world*
MARIA GABRIELSEN JUMBERT





University of Basel, Gellertstrasse , P.O. Box, CH- Basel,
Switzerland
Email: david.lanz@unibas.ch
A B S T R A C T
This article is concerned with the rebellion in Darfur as a way to illustrate the
politics of insurgency in the era of globalisation. We ﬁrst show how the Darfur
rebels have projected their struggle onto the world stage, before examining
the effects that this has engendered. On the one hand, Darfur’s global proﬁle
solidiﬁed the rebels’ cause and co-opted international actors in support of
it. This translated into real leverage for the rebels, and it constrained the
Sudanese government by reducing its ability to use brute force. At the same
time, internationalisation encouraged the Darfur rebels to make maximalist
demands at the expense of articulating a broader political vision addressing
the root causes of conﬂict. Moreover, the substitution of local legitimacy for
international connections lowered the barriers of entry for new groups and
thus promoted fragmentation. The combination of these effects makes for
intractable conﬂict scenarios, the current situation in Darfur being a case in
point.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
In April , an amalgam of Darfur rebels attacked the airport of
El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. The attack was a resounding
success, as it pulverised the Sudanese army’s air force presence in
Darfur. However, the world did not notice the attack. Neither did it pay
attention when the government, with the aid of militia groups, launched
a brutal counter-insurgency campaign aimed at destroying the support
base of the rebels. Change only came around the ten-year anniversary of
the Rwanda genocide in April  when a senior UN ofﬁcial compared
the situation in Darfur with Rwanda. This triggered extensive media
coverage and, eventually, a vocal advocacy movement that succeeded
in making Darfur a cause célèbre in Western public opinion.
Within months, Darfur underwent a process of fast-track globalisation.
Undoubtedly, this process has affected the dynamics of the Darfur
conﬂict, not least because it led to far-reaching international involve-
ment. Thus, international actors set up the world’s largest humanitarian
operation, deployed the biggest UN peacekeeping mission, and indicted
the Sudanese president on the grounds of war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide.
Evidently, the globalisation of Darfur also had ramiﬁcations for the
rebel movements. In this context, Mamdani (: ) argued that
the one-sided portrayal of the conﬂict in Darfur as genocide led
Western countries to neglect the role of rebel groups in perpetuating
the violence. Beyond Mamdani’s rather provocative argument, this
paper aims to make sense of the trajectory of the Darfur insurgency
in the context of worldwide publicity. How have the insurgents
contributed to making Darfur a global cause célèbre? How has the
interaction with the world fed back and inﬂuenced the course of the
rebellion? In tackling these questions, we utilise the empirical material
from our respective doctoral research projects. In particular, we draw
on over  interviews that we each conducted with various
international and Sudanese experts, including representatives of rebel
movements.
Our analysis is also inspired by the literature on ‘the international
politics of insurgency’, which Clapham (: –) identiﬁed as one
factor undermining African states since the s. Thus, the inter-
nationalisation of rebellion has been promoted by a few sympathetic
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that generate publicity and
deploy their contacts in support of the insurgents. Bob () sees
insurgent groups as agents in this process, actively promoting their
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struggle on a ‘market for transnational support’ with the aim of
obtaining international recognition and support. Only the savviest
groups succeed in framing their struggle in such a way that it resonates
with advocacy networks in the West, which then help to popularise their
cause. On a related note, Schlichte () described the need for rebel
groups to generate legitimacy for their struggle as a way of overcoming
the de-legitimising effect of violence. One way of doing this is for
insurgents to appeal to international norms and sponsors, for example
by framing their struggle in terms of the widely accepted right to
self-determination. Another example is Kuperman’s () application
of the moral hazard problem to provide a somewhat reductionist theory
of civil wars: the growing acceptance of humanitarian intervention
thus provides an incentive for rebel groups to escalate their struggle,
hoping the brutality of the government’s retaliation will trigger
international intervention.
Their differences notwithstanding, these authors all diverge from
the literature on the political economy of civil wars (e.g. Collier &
Hoefﬂer ) in that they conceive of the notion of ‘internationalisa-
tion’ not merely as an economic strategy of accumulation beyond
borders, but as a social process, through which insurgent groups
articulate their struggle on the global level. It is this latter approach
that we adopt. We thus focus less on the material dimension of
internationalisation – for example the support that neighbouring
countries, namely Chad, Eritrea and Libya, provided the Darfur rebels
with. Rather, we focus on ideational elements of internationalisation,
such as the existence of an advocacy movement and the framing
of Darfur as genocide. Taking this into account, we put forward the
following core argument: internationalisation has ambiguous effects on
insurgent groups, enabling and disabling their struggle at the same time.
Thus, on the one hand, it solidiﬁes their cause and co-opts international
actors in support of it. This translates into real leverage for the rebels,
and it constrains the government by reducing its ability to use brute
force. At the same time, internationalisation, by creating the perception
that international backing is forthcoming, may foster maximalist
demands at the expense of articulating a broader political vision
addressing the root causes of conﬂict. Moreover, the substitution of
local legitimacy for international connections lowers the barriers of
entry for new groups and may thus promote fragmentation. In the
absence of decisive international intervention, the combination of these
effects makes for intractable conﬂict scenarios, oscillating between
low-level conﬂict and occasional escalation, without the prospect
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of sustainable resolution. Indeed, this accurately describes the current
situation in Darfur ten years after the outbreak of the insurgency.
In developing this argument, the article is structured as follows: we
ﬁrst provide a short synopsis of the Darfur rebellion and describe
the context in which Darfur became a global cause célèbre. Second,
we consider the mechanisms through which the Darfur rebels have
contributed to this process by projecting their struggle onto the world
stage. In the third part, we discuss the implications of internationalisa-
tion in the context of Darfur and formulate the propositions that
constitute our core argument. We conclude by brieﬂy discussing the
theoretical implications of our research and by suggesting avenues for
further research.
T H E D A R F U R C O N F L I C T A N D I T S I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E
Darfur was an independent sultanate until  when it was irrevocably
integrated into greater Sudan, at the time under Anglo-Egyptian
colonial rule (Daly ). Within the Sudanese state it has for a long
time been a marginalised region deprived of resources and lacking
political autonomy. However, Darfuri political opposition used to be
primarily focused on non-violent constitutional channels (El-Battahani
: –). This changed after – when Darfur became the
stage of a regional proxy war spilling over from Chad (Prunier ). As
Darfur was ﬂooded with cheap weapons and supremacist Arab ideology,
armed conﬂict between non-Arab sedentary tribes – chieﬂy the Fur,
Massalit and Zaghawa – and Arab nomads broke out, entrenching
antagonistic ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ identities among many Darfurians
(De Waal ). This provided the background against which two
distinct rebellions emerged in Darfur, one of which had its roots in the
farming communities of non-Arab tribes. As tensions mounted in
the mid-s, three students from the Fur tribe, Abdel Wahid al-Nur,
Ahmad Abdel Shaﬁ and Abdu Abdalla Ismail, came together in
Khartoum and created a clandestine organisation, which later became
the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M). They made an
alliance with Zaghawa and later Massalit leaders in  and staged
their ﬁrst joint attack on an army garrison in February  (Flint & de
Waal : ).
At a similar time, another rebel movement was formed by disaffected
members of the Sudanese political elite, the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM). JEM was founded by Darfuri members of the National
Islamic Front, who left the government when Hassan al-Turabi,
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the initial leader of the Islamist movement in Sudan, was ousted from
power in –. JEMmade its entrance on the political arena when
it published the ‘Black Book’ in May , which offered ‘a political
and economic anatomy of Sudan that detailed the marginalisation
of most of Sudan’s citizens’ (Flint & de Waal : ). Drawing on
extensive data on various types of inequalities in Sudan, the Black Book
constituted the ﬁrst political manifesto of JEM. Indeed, throughout
the conﬂict JEM has had an advantage over the SLA thanks to its ability
to articulate a coherent political agenda. However, some Darfurians
have remained cautious with regards to JEM, not only because of its
strong component of Islamists, but because many of its leaders are
Zaghawa from the Kobe branch that inhabits the border area between
Chad and Sudan (Tanner & Tubiana : –). Indeed, the cross-
border connections of the Zaghawa have been one of the main factors
of the intertwining of the Darfur conﬂict and the crisis in Chad. This led
to what Marchal () has termed a ‘system of conﬂicts’ across the
Chad–Sudan border.
The rebellion in Darfur is often said to have started in earnest in
February , when the Darfur Liberation Front (later to become the
SLA) claimed an attack on Gulu, a district headquarters in central
Darfur. At that time, the government of Sudan was engaged in peace
talks with the Southern insurgents, the SPLA/M. The Darfur rebels,
holding their own deep-seeded grievances, took notice of the far-
reaching concessions that the southern insurgents were obtaining from
the government. Moreover, the SPLM, looking to increase its leverage
over Khartoum, provided the Darfur rebels with training and arms,
and they also helped them write a political manifesto reminiscent
of the SPLM’s ‘New Sudan’ concept (International Crisis Group (ICG)
: ; Flint & de Waal : –; Roessler ). The Darfur
rebellion was deﬁnitively launched on  April , when SLA and
JEM jointly attacked the airport of El Fasher. The attack was a
resounding success for the rebels, as they destroyed half a dozen military
aircrafts and captured an air force general. As Flint & de Waal (:
) note: ‘In more than twenty years’ war in the South, the SPLA had
never inﬂicted such a loss on the air force. The rebels were jubilant.’
After the Fasher attack, the Sudanese government realised that the
Darfur rebels were a force to be reckoned with. Having dismissed earlier
attempts by the governor of North Darfur, General Ibrahim Suleiman,
to negotiate with the rebels, the government handed the Darfur ﬁle over
to the Sudanese military intelligence (Flint & de Waal : –).
They sought to crush the rebels, but relying on their own armed forces
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would have required heavy redeployment and training, which was
not feasible. Instead, the Khartoum security establishment opted for
‘counter-insurgency on the cheap’ (DeWaal ) by arming local Arab
militia, the so-called ‘Janjaweed’, promising them impunity and
supporting them with air attacks (Hagar ). This strategy was
reminiscent of the North–South civil war, where the government had
repeatedly used local militias in its ﬁght against the SPLA (Johnson
; Rolandsen ). The scorched earth tactic deployed in Darfur
was supposed to destroy the civilian support base of the rebels, but it ﬁrst
and foremost led to massive killings and displacements (De Waal ).
In early , thousands of people, mostly from non-Arab tribes, were
killed and over a million displaced. The months between July  and
spring  were thus the most violent period of the conﬂict.
It was only towards the end of this period that the world started to pay
attention to Darfur. Rebel groups, humanitarian organisations and
Darfurians in the diaspora, had in vain sounded the alarm bell during
the early stages of the conﬂict, followed by calls for action from advocacy
organisations like Amnesty International () and the International
Crisis Group (ICG) (). Even when in December , Jan Egeland,
then UN Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, characterised
the humanitarian situation in Darfur as ‘one of the worst in the world’
(quoted in United Nations News Centre ) the world remained
passive. The turning point came on the eve of the ten-year commemora-
tion of the Rwandan genocide in March . This was when Mukesh
Kapila, the UN humanitarian coordinator in Khartoum told news
channels that ‘the only difference between Rwanda and Darfur now is
the numbers involved’ (quoted in IRIN News ).
The inference that genocide was occurring in Darfur was soon picked
up by journalists and opinion leaders. Starting in late March ,
Nicholas Kristof from the New York Times began to proliﬁcally write
opinion editorials about Darfur, often comparing the conﬂict with the
Rwanda genocide. Similarly, the anti-genocide scholar Samantha Power
contributed an editorial with the title ‘Remember Rwanda, but Take
Action in Sudan’ (New York Times, ..), while Romeo Dallaire, the
famous UN force commander of the ill-fated UN peacekeeping mission
during the Rwanda genocide, wrote ‘Looking at Darfur, Seeing Rwanda’
(Toronto Star, ..). The message could not have been clearer:
Darfur was framed as the ‘new’ Rwanda (Murphy ; Brunk ).
Against the background of the rising press coverage, a civil society
advocacy campaign started to take shape in the USA during the summer
of . In July, the Save Darfur Coalition (SDC) was created
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by an amalgam of human rights organisations and faith-based groups,
many of them Jewish organisations (Hamilton ). In the UK, the
Protect Darfur campaign, coordinated by the advocacy group Aegis
Trust, was established in March . In France, the ‘Urgence Darfour’
coalition was founded in February .
The level of civil society mobilisation around Darfur went beyond
expectations, and governments soon reacted with myriad of measures,
albeit shying away from military intervention. Thus, governments
provided funding for humanitarian aid operations; they referred the
situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC); and they
deployed a peacekeeping mission with a Chapter VII mandate from
the UN Security Council, which replaced the existing African Union
(AU) monitors (Lanz ). The Darfur crisis also triggered a number
of diplomatic initiatives. Starting in late , efforts were undertaken
to facilitate peace talks between the government and the different
rebel movements. Under the mediation of Chadian President Déby, the
parties signed a ceaseﬁre agreement in April , but the agreement
was never implemented. The peace talks continued under the auspices
of the AU, ﬁrst in Addis Ababa and then in Abuja, Nigeria, where
a peace agreement was eventually signed in May . However, the
agreement was widely considered as ﬂawed, as it was only signed by one
of three rebel leaders, Minni Minawi, who had splintered away from the
SLA in , and as a result of intense pressures from international
sponsors (Nathan ). Neither Abdel Wahid nor Khalil Ibrahim
signed the Abuja agreement, which was followed by increased ﬁghting
on the ground in Darfur (Fadul & Tanner ) and fragmentation
within the rebel groups (Flint ; Assal ).
The UN and the AU, through the joint efforts of Salim Ahmed
Salim and Jan Eliasson, subsequently tried to re-launch negotiations, but
they were not successful. It was only in September  that the peace
process received new impetus when Qatar became the new sponsor of
the negotiations between the Darfur rebels and the Sudanese govern-
ment. The talks went on for many months, as the Darfur rebels ﬁlled the
ﬁve-star hotels of Doha. Eventually, in July , the government signed
an agreement with a new faction, led by the former Umma Party ofﬁcial
Tijani Sese, although JEM had opted out of the process earlier and
Abdel Wahid never came to the table. Sese returned to Sudan in
October, while the government selectively implemented some of the
constitutional provisions of the Doha agreement. In any case, the peace
process was marred by continued ﬁghting on the ground and by
a context of intense bargaining and politicking in Khartoum following
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the secession of South Sudan in July . Thus, JEM, Abdel Wahid and
Minni Minawi, who had rescinded the DPA in the meantime, joined
forces with the rebels of the SPLA-North in South Kordofan and Blue
Nile and formed the Sudan Revolutionary Front in November . The
rebel alliance suffered a setback when JEM’s Chairman, Khalil Ibrahim
was killed in an aerial attack the following month.
H O W T H E D A R F U R R E B E L S P R O J E C T E D T H E I R C A U S E O N T H E
W O R L D S T A G E
Darfur did not, of course, become a cause célèbre on its own. Rather,
it was the outcome of deliberate action by people and organisations
that sought to raise the international proﬁle of Darfur. Scholars have
examined the role of transnational advocacy groups (Mamdani ;
Gabrielsen , Lanz , ; Gabrielsen Jumbert ; Hamilton
) and the media (Murphy ; Ray ; Mody ) in this
process. The role of the rebel movements has not, however, been
systematically analysed, although their efforts were clearly a signiﬁcant
factor in the process of internationalisation that Darfur has undergone
since March . How did they go about it? We have identiﬁed four
interrelated mechanisms through which the rebels have projected their
struggle onto the world stage, which we will present in turn: inviting
foreign journalists; activating diaspora networks; connecting with Darfur
activists; and adapting their discourse. Notable is that in all their efforts
to reach out to the world, the Darfur rebels have relied on modern
communications technology, most importantly the internet, satellite and
mobile phones.
Inviting foreign journalists
The global media plays a key role in raising international awareness
about conﬂicts in remote areas. Not surprisingly, the Darfur rebels have
from early on engaged with foreign journalists and encouraged them
to visit the areas under their control, the so-called ‘liberated areas’.
According to one foreign correspondent covering Sudan ( int.),
‘The Darfur rebels recognised that they could use the international
media as a weapon in their war. I found it relatively easy to contact the
SLA to travel with them in Jebel Mara, likewise with JEM in North
Darfur.’ These visits were often facilitated by diaspora members of the
rebel groups in Western countries. On the ground, the journalists were
picked up by middlemen, who brought the journalists to rebel-held
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areas from across the border in Chad or from one of Darfur’s main
towns. In the liberated areas, the journalists would live and travel with
rebel contingents. The British ﬁlmmaker Philip Cox, who was one of
the ﬁrst foreign journalists to visit Darfur in early , is a case in point.
His visit was organised by a London-based activist and sympathiser of
the SLM, who later also brought journalists from Al-Jazeera to Darfur
(SLM member  int.). The visit was very effective. Cox provided the
ﬁrst TV images of the Darfur conﬂict, which were broadcast around
the world, and he also facilitated visits of other news teams. He later
recalled: ‘Before I left Darfur I called up BBC and they were very excited.
And eventually I sold the material to Channel  and to CNN, ARD,
Scandinavian and Japanese TV. Everyone came in. This was in April,
May . And then a lot of people wanted my contacts to get in. For a
while there were various news teams. I had no problem putting them in
touch with my rebel contacts.’ (Philip Cox  int.) Cox later
produced an award-winning documentary about his time with the SLA,
which was widely broadcast.
As Darfur hit the headlines in the summer of , the rebels
proceeded to organise visits of international NGOs, who would bring
with them embedded journalists. This was the case of the Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA), which has a long experience working in SPLA-
controlled areas in South Sudan. According to an NPA representative
( int.),
In July , we made a trip to the SLA areas in the Jebel Marra area. This
was the ﬁrst media visit to the region. The Norwegian daily Dagbladet was
on board, along with two European TV-companies, Reuters and one other.
The SLA with Ahmed Abdul Shaﬁ organised our trip. He was the foreign
affairs ofﬁcer of Abdel Wahid al-Nur at that time. This was the ﬁrst visit to
the rebel-held South Darfur.
Around the same time, John Prendergast and Samantha Power went to
the liberated areas of Darfur. Their accounts received a lot of publicity
and essentially relayed the narrative of the rebels. In an opinion editorial
in the New York Times (..), Prendergast recounted: ‘Bodies of
young men were lined up in ditches, eerily preserved by the -degree
desert heat. The story the rebels told us seemed plausible: the dead were
civilians who had been marched up a hill and executed by the Arab-led
government before its troops abandoned the area the previous month.
The rebels assert that there were many other such scenes.’ An article
by Power in the New Yorker (..) included similarly gory scenes.
Both Prendergast and Power became inﬂuential ﬁgures in the Darfur
advocacy movement.
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The closest to a perfect propaganda stunt for the rebels was a later
visit by French writer and celebrity-activist Bernard-Henri Lévy. His
journey to Darfur in March  was sponsored by the Save Darfur
Coalition and organised by Abdel Wahid al-Nur in Paris, where the SLA
leader lived in exile from  until . On the ground, BHL, as he
is known in France, was assisted by Abdel Wahid’s men from the SLA,
who brought him into Darfur from Chad (Tubiana ). His account
of the situation in Darfur was published in Le Monde (..) and
essentially made him a spokesperson of the rebels. Thus, BHL
recommended that the international community arm the rebels in
order to help them win the war in Darfur. His call had little echo in the
international community, but he became one of the driving forces in
the French advocacy movement and contributed to enhancing the
French media coverage of the Darfur conﬂict (Weissman ). To
sum up, despite some unsuccessful attempts to trigger international
media attention in , the insurgents facilitated several trips of
international journalists and opinion leaders from  onwards.
This greatly helped to make Darfur known and relayed the rebels’
narrative to the world. It also committed their visitors, many of them
well-known writers with extensive connections and media pull, to the
Darfur cause.
Activating diaspora networks
When the insurgency started, the Darfur diaspora played a major
role. According to the Sudanese scholar Suliman Baldo ( int.),
‘The shock of the ﬁrst reports about Darfur provoked a major reaction
within the Darfur diaspora. In North America, Europe, the Middle East,
they got organised to make known what was happening in Darfur and
to help their communities back home. They mobilised a lot of support.’
The Darfur rebels managed to capture some of this support, which
contributed to internationalising their cause. For example, members of
the diaspora helped the insurgents on the ground acquire satellite
phones. These phones were useful on the battleﬁeld and they allowed
the rebels to call journalists and human rights organisations, something
they were unable to do at the outset of the conﬂict in  (Flint & de
Waal : ). Thus, members of the Darfur diaspora transferred
funds to afﬁliates in Dubai – a place that did not fall under the Sudanese
sanctions regime. The middlemen subsequently sent the -digit scratch
card codes via SMS to the ﬁeld, allowing the rebels to recharge their
Thuraya satellite phones (SLM member  int.). Beyond material
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support, the diaspora was instrumental for the rebels in establishing
political connections in Western capitals. According to I.D.F. & Assal
(: –), ‘These social networks and an understanding of how
politics worked in these countries helped the rebels develop effective
connections beyond Sudan’s borders.’ Germany is a case in point.
According to Haydar Ibrahim ( int.) of the Khartoum-based
Sudanese Studies Centre,
Germany seems like the centre for the Darfurian people abroad. Most
Darfuris in Germany are afﬁliated with different armed movements
in Darfur, the SLM, the JEM, and all the others. All the factions and
the different movements have representatives in Germany, in Berlin, in
Frankfurt and even in the small towns. The main source of the news and the
mass media are these Darfuris and even the Sudanese government is
accusing Germany of supporting the Darfuris.
All rebel movements relied on diaspora members. For example, JEM
relied on Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, an anthropology professor in
Ireland. He described his role as follows ( int.): ‘I want to connect
JEM with the West. For this, I give lectures and I go to meetings. I do
interviews. I talk in the radio. I represent JEM in the English-speaking
world. I also attend negotiations. I was in Abuja and Doha.’ As
interlocutors with Western governments, people like El-Tom are useful
to raise awareness about Darfur and to alleviate fears raised by JEM’s
Islamist background. The diaspora connections were equally important
for the SLM. Abel Wahid had spokespersons in different capitals.
Particularly important was Ahmed Mohamedain Abdalla, a Darfuri
based in Canada, who provided advice, drafted speeches, and liaised
with foreign governments on Abdel Wahid’s behalf. Two other ﬁgures
stand out in the SLM’s diaspora network: the doyen of Darfuri political
opposition and Chairman of the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance
(SFDA), Ahmed Diraige, and Sharif Harir, former lecturer of anthro-
pology in Norway and co-founder of the SFDA. Diraige was somewhat
sceptical about the ‘young Turks’ in the Darfur rebel movement and,
apart from a brief engagement as head of the National Redemption
Front, stayed outside the rebellion (Diraige  int.). However, he was
a relentless advocate of the Darfur cause and acted as a mentor for many
SLA rebels. Harir was formally integrated in the SLM and participated in
peace negotiations as one of its representatives. In a nutshell, the
diaspora acted as translators between the locally rooted rebels and the
global reality of international politics. Activating the diaspora network
thus served to increase the knowledge about the situation in Darfur in
the international realm.
G L O B A L I S E D R E B E L L I O N
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X13000177
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 13:50:20, subject to the Cambridge Core
Connecting with the Darfur activists
As mentioned above, a civil society advocacy campaign emerged in
the USA, the UK and France starting in . This campaign was
instrumental in raising the proﬁle of Darfur in global public opinion
and it undoubtedly helped the rebels internationalise their cause. The
campaign provided the rebels with a ready-made platform, which
functioned as an intermediary between the rebels and international
audiences. The campaigns boosted the rebels’ proﬁle and gave them
instant credibility on what Bob () called the ‘market for transna-
tional support’. For example, when Suleiman Jamous, at the time SLM’s
humanitarian coordinator, was held by the government, Mia Farrow’s
son Ronan wrote an editorial in the Wall Street Journal (..)
calling for Jamous’s release and comparing him with Nelson Mandela.
In turn, the rebel representatives provided the activists with information
from the ﬁeld, shaping a narrative that was conducive to internationalis-
ing Darfur. Thus, Abdel Wahid’s advisor Abdul Mohamedain worked
with Eric Reeves, one of the most proliﬁc Sudan campaigners in the
USA, as an editor of his  book on Darfur, A Long Day’s Dying.
Crucial to establish the linkages between rebel movements and activists
were members of the Sudanese diaspora working for advocacy groups
in North America and Europe, such as Omer Ismail of the Enough
Project, Niemat Ahmadi of SDC and Abdelbagi Jibril of the Darfur Relief
and Documentation Centre. While they did not formally belong to the
movements, and even occasionally criticised them, they shared the
rebels’ anti-government stance and helped to secure communication
with the activist milieu.
However, despite these linkages, the USA-based advocacy movement,
and SDC in particular, was keen to differentiate itself from the rebels,
especially on the question of non-consensual military intervention,
which it did not advocate for. This led to some frustrations among the
rebels. According to an SDC representative ( int.), ‘We didn’t
coordinate with rebel groups, to the contrary. When we met them they
were lecturing us why we weren’t calling for bombing Sudan.’ It appears
that some of the activists, on request of the UN–AU mediators, even
tried to get Abdel Wahid to join the peace talks, albeit to no avail (SDC
representative  int.). The US activists’ reluctance to be associated
with the rebels was reﬂected during a rally in Paris organised by Urgence
Darfour on  March , a few weeks before the French presidential
elections. Reportedly, an envoy from SDC had come to Paris especially
for this meeting. He expressed his concern with the list of attendants
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and speakers, stressing that he did not wish to shake hands with Abdel
Wahid, who was also present. The French activists visibly had less trouble
with that. The rally was not intended as a support meeting for the Darfur
rebels, but it nonetheless resembled that, as Abdel Wahid raised his ﬁst
as a symbol of victory every time someone mentioned the rebellion
in Darfur. BHL was present at the meeting, along with the leadership
of the French Darfur advocacy movement, and most candidates of the
upcoming presidential elections. One of the speakers was Bernard
Kouchner, a long-term advocate of humanitarian intervention, who was
a few months later nominated as France’s foreign minister by then
President Nicolas Sarkozy. Kouchner’s appointment was seen by many
as an attempt by the new government to co-opt the Darfur activist
movement (Glaser & Smith : –). Although there was no ofﬁcial
support from the Ministry, it maintained close contacts with Abdel
Wahid, and Kouchner continued to champion the cause of Darfur
during his tenure as foreign minister. Abdel Wahid also took advantage
of his association with BHL, who invited him to public events and
opened a blog for him on his online platform ‘La règle du jeu’. Thus,
regardless of whether the activist movements kept their distance or
engaged more directly with the Darfur rebels, the massive campaign
around Darfur allowed them to project their cause in the world and
created the impression that they had far-reaching international support.
Adapting the discourse
Another mechanism of projection for the Darfur rebels consisted in
the alignment of their discourses with well-known categories in the west,
such as genocide, federalism and humanitarian intervention. This was
useful because it generated legitimacy for the rebellion and provided
a framework for public opinion in Western countries to make sense of
the events in far-away Darfur. Clapham (: ) aptly captured
this dynamic when he stressed the importance of language in the
internationalisation of rebellion: ‘Politicians everywhere use different
vocabularies to address different audiences, but the range required of
insurgent leaders is particularly great, stretching from the mobilisation
of indigenous spirituality, on the one hand, to the matching mobilis-
ation of Western ideologies of development, democracy or human rights
on the other.’
Abdel Wahid is particularly adept in calibrating his speeches. In an
interview with one of the authors, not only did he consistently refer to
the conﬂict in Darfur as genocide, but he also spoke of ‘concentration
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camps’ when talking about the internally displaced camps in Darfur
and of the ‘ﬁnal solution’ when referring to Khartoum’s actions (Al-Nur
 int.). The reference to the Holocaust both served to render the
urgency to ‘do something’ about Darfur and to denigrate the Sudanese
governments and those advocating for engagement with it. Another
example in this respect is al-Nur’s opinion editorial in the Wall Street
Journal (..) entitled ‘Why We Won’t Talk to Sudan’s Islamo-
Fascists’. In it, Abdel Wahid painted the Darfur rebellion as a bulwark
against Islamist extremism: ‘We founded the SLM in  in response
to the violence perpetrated by the Arab-Islamist dictatorship of G. Omar
al-Bashir. His National Islamic Front had seized power three years earlier
in a military coup and immediately engaged in a brutal jihad against
the African population in South Sudan, in the Blue Nile and Nuba
Mountain region.’ Deploying the term ‘jihad’ here directly addressed
the US public opinion, particularly wary of the consequences of Islamic
extremism since  September . At the same time, Abdel Wahid
portrayed himself as a progressive leader: ‘we must forge new alliances,
no longer based upon race or religion, but upon shared values of
freedom and democracy. This is why we opened a representative ofﬁce
in Israel last February.’ Notably, the mention of the terms ‘freedom’ and
‘democracy’ echoed US regime change discourses, while the association
with Israel sought to place the SLM in proximity of a traditional US ally.
Abdel Wahid also ﬁne-tuned his discourse for French public opinion,
emphasising his role as the leader of the Darfuri resistance, as
mentioned below.
JEM’s discourse is more sophisticated in terms of generating
international support for their cause. Khalil Ibrahim continuously
emphasised the marginalisation of Darfur in the wider context of the
imbalance between an all-powerful centre and neglected peripheries – a
recurrent theme since the publication of the Black Book in . This
discourse resonated particularly in Sudan among those who have long
been excluded from political power. While keeping with the essence of
the centre-periphery argument, JEM slightly adapted its discourse when
addressing international audiences. Indicative of this is the fact that
the English translation of the Black Book differs in some respects from
the Arabic original (Bolton ). Thus, the English version appeals
to a more international audience, while the original was oriented
to a Sudanese and Islamist audience. Beyond the Black Book, JEM
has articulated a federalist solution based on power sharing between
different regions in Sudan, similar to the organisation of the state
in the USA or Germany. El-Tom ( int.) articulated this vision
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as follows: ‘Our aim is to restructure Sudan and create a system whereby
all Sudanese would have equal opportunities, responsibilities and status
irrespective of their religion, creed, region, language and so forth. We
want a democratic system whereby people would elect all their leaders
from the council to the president. And we want a confederal system
whereby each region has autonomous powers.’ This is echoed by an
interview that Khalil Ibrahim gave in : ‘The entire “periphery” of
the country wants liberation from the “centre”. The only way out is for
Sudan to become a federation, which would consist of (six) autonomous
regions. This can be accomplished by preserving the religious diversity
and working on the basis of consensus politics’ (quoted in Loeb et al.
: ). Thus, the discourse on federalism resonates with Western
political elites familiar with this kind of state structure, while the
marginalisation of the periphery by the centre is a common theme
for the political left, which has used this model to make sense of the
domination of capitalist societies in the centre over developing countries
in the periphery.
H O W I N T E R N A T I O N A L I S A T I O N A F F E C T E D T H E D A R F U R
I N S U R G E N C Y
Provided the context of the Darfur conﬂict, it is easy to understand why
the Darfur rebels sought to internationalise their struggle. The rebels
were the weaker party in military terms, and while they could inﬂict
serious damage on the government through hit-and-run guerrilla tactics,
winning the war on the battleﬁeld was not feasible. Most importantly, the
people the rebels sought to defend were suffering vicious attacks,
which led to mass killings and displacements. However, at the outset of
the conﬂict in – Darfur was not known in the international
community, which meant that the government did not face inter-
national condemnation for its actions. Shining the spotlight on Darfur
was an attempt by the rebels to change this dynamic. It was a way of
taking the ﬁght to a different level. After  September , the
Sudanese regime of Omar al-Bashir was eager to break out of the
international isolation into which it had manoeuvred itself (Johnson
). Thanks to the signature of the Machakos Protocol in July 
and its willingness to work towards a comprehensive agreement with
the SPLM, Khartoum was starting to regain some legitimacy among
Western countries with the prospect of full normalisation later on.
The internationalisation of the Darfur conﬂict undermined this
process, which was a way for the rebels to hit their adversary where it
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hurt the most. These considerations notwithstanding, it is important to
realise that strategy is not everything. Drawing international attention to
the situation in Darfur also served as an outlet for the rebels’ frustration
and helplessness over the suffering that Darfuris were enduring during
the conﬂict – a reaction that is both natural and legitimate.
How has internationalisation affected the Darfur insurgency? In what
follows, we formulate three propositions, which seem plausible based on
our own observations as well as other people’s accounts of the Darfur
insurgency. Thus, we argue that internationalisation has encouraged
maximalist demands and fostered a lack of willingness to compromise
in peace talks. It has also fostered internal fragmentation and a lack
of engagement on the local level. On a more positive note, we ﬁnd it
plausible that internationalisation has contributed to deterring extreme
violence in Darfur, although there is no conclusive evidence to
substantiate this claim. Armed conﬂicts are complex social processes
affected by a multitude of factors, not least the military capabilities
of conﬂict parties. In our view, internationalisation is one factor
having inﬂuenced the Darfur rebellion on certain levels. However,
our propositions do not represent hard-and-fast causal claims, but seek
to open the debate about the repercussions of the changing politics of
insurgency in a globalised world.
Grandstanding rhetoric and intransigence
The internationalisation of Darfur has encouraged grandstanding
rhetoric and fostered a lack of willingness to compromise among rebel
groups. For example, Abdel Wahid al-Nur labelled the Sudanese
government ‘Islamo-fascist’ and ‘génocidaire’ and called for regime
change on a conservative pro-Israeli online broadcasting platform.
Khalil Ibrahim disparaged Omar al-Bashir as a criminal and demanded
that he be arrested and tried at the ICC (quoted in Loeb et al. ).
That conﬂict parties denounce each other with harsh rhetoric is not
unusual per se, and it is certainly understandable in Darfur, given the
scale of the crimes committed by Khartoum. However, in other conﬂicts,
parties are eventually obliged to moderate their stance and seek a
compromise with their enemy; otherwise they risk being eclipsed. The
internationalisation of the Darfur conﬂict, and its framing as
genocide, has engendered a different dynamic. The Darfur rebels were
much more likely to get the attention of the media, activist groups
and policymakers, which are crucial in an asymmetric context like
Darfur, if they perpetuated the dominant narrative of the conﬂict.
 M A R I A G A B R I E L S E N J U M B E R T A N D D A V I D L A N Z
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X13000177
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 13:50:20, subject to the Cambridge Core
The international environment thus provided an incentive for grand-
standing rhetoric, rewarding those who bought into it and penalising
those who did not. For some rebel leaders, in particular Abdel Wahid,
intransigence has thus become a rational strategy. Instead of political
engagement, these leaders prefer to adopt a wait-and-see attitude,
hoping that international help will be forthcoming in the future.
A statement about the ICC indictment of al-Bashir by a young
student afﬁliated with one of the rebel groups ( int.) is telling:
‘It is good that the international community has accused the president,
now they have to come and arrest him.’ Another example is Abdel
Wahid’s stance towards peace talks. In Abuja, he demanded ‘a guarantee
for implementation like in Bosnia’ (quoted in De Waal ).
According to Alex de Waal (), who served as an advisor to the
AU mediation team in Abuja, the fact that the desired NATO
intervention was not forthcoming was one of the reasons why Abdel
Wahid refused to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement. This position
related to the debate about Darfur on the international level: activists
were demanding the deployment of a robust peacekeeping mission,
which they thought was more important than peace talks. At a big Darfur
rally in Washington, which took place in April  during the ﬁnal
stages of the Abuja talks, some activists booed a US government
representative speaking about peace negotiations. After the DPA, the
International Crisis Group (), which at the time had a close
relationship with the Darfur activists, criticised the Abuja agreement for
not making security guarantees in the form of a robust peacekeeping
force a priority.
After Abuja, al-Nur maintained his stance, refusing to participate
in peace talks altogether. This even led his friend Bernard Kouchner to
call him ‘stubborn’ (Libération, ..). In response, al-Nur ()
justiﬁed his position, invoking General De Gaulle for this purpose:
[M]y French friends . . . explained to me how the Maréchal Pétain, in order
to avoid military defeat, chose to collaborate with Hitler and deliver the Jews
into the hands of the Nazis occupants. They told me how De Gaulle left
the country, almost alone, and launched his famous June  appeal to the
French to refuse defeat and German domination. Of the two, which one
won? Who saved France? . . . This is why I do not understand why your
government is asking me to become the Pétain of Darfur.
Before negotiating with the Sudanese government, al-Nur demands
that security be guaranteed by an international force that is different
from the current peacekeeping mission: ‘These troops are there to
maintain the peace. Shouldn’t there then be ﬁrst a peace to maintain.
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The Sudanese government is still at war against us. We don’t need
maintainers of peace, we needmakers of peace.’ These claims only make
sense against the background of the internationalisation of the Darfur
conﬂict. Instead of taking responsibility and negotiating a peace
settlement that requires painful compromises, Abdel Wahid preferred
to opt out, hoping that the international context will change in his favour.
Another consequence of grandstanding rhetoric seems to be that
it crowded out more constructive discussions about how the conﬂict
in Darfur can be resolved and how governance could be organised to
prevent future conﬂicts. For example, it is not surprising that the two
most constructive proposals for a long-term solution of the Darfur
conﬂict – the Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue Outcome Document and the
Doha Declaration – were elaborated by representatives of civil society
and not by rebel groups. One of the reasons for this may be that these
proposals run counter to the dominant narrative of Darfur in the
international community, whose support the rebels seek. For example,
comparing Darfur with the Holocaust implies that violence in the
conﬂict is not the result of a complicated social process, but simply of
the projection of evil. The remedy, therefore, is not to negotiate a
political settlement involving all parties to the conﬂict, but to stage
an intervention stopping the ongoing genocide and punishing those
responsible.
Fragmentation and lack of local engagement
Darfur’s status as a global cause célèbre made it an object of prestige in
international diplomacy. As a result, all kinds of international actors –
the UN, the AU, the Arab League, the US, European states, Sudan’s
neighbouring countries, a host of international NGOs – professed their
willingness to contribute to the resolution of the Darfur conﬂict. The
competition among Arab states was particularly intense. When Qatar
became the ofﬁcial venue for the negotiations, both Egypt and Libya
launched parallel processes (Flint : –). Such activism led to
a proliferation of often uncoordinated talks, consultations, and work-
shops, allowing the rebels to ‘shop around’ for the most promising
forum. Peacemaking thus became a lucrative livelihood strategy, as the
rebels travelled around the world, lived off generous per diems, and
stayed in luxurious hotels. Tellingly, this earned them the nickname
‘hotel rebels’.
The courting of the Darfur insurgents by international actors had two
problematic consequences. One is that it lowered the barriers of entry
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for new rebel groups and thus encouraged endless fragmentation and
factionalisation. The establishment of a new group, and therefore the
prospect of receiving international recognition and material beneﬁts,
was no longer linked to a leader’s grassroots support or ﬁghting power.
Instead it depended on his international connections. Not surprisingly
therefore, since the Abuja agreement in , the Darfur insurgents
have excessively fragmented (Tanner & Tubiana ). This created
serious obstacles to peace, as it proved impossible to have serious
negotiations with a multitude of actors whose alliances are constantly
shifting. Also, the fragmentation made it easy for the Sudanese
government to neutralise the rebel movements by applying the same
divide-and-rule tactics that it had used during the war against the SPLM.
An international journalist ( int.), who has travelled to Darfur with
the rebels multiple times, describes these effects as follows:
Negotiating somewhere in a foreign country with nice hotels, prostitutes,
and alcohol made it that the rebels did not feel like returning to Darfur.
This creates a caste within the rebel movement, which jet-sets from one
conference to another, losing their sense of reality in the process. The less
intelligent ﬁghters remain in the ﬁeld, the more intelligent ones are sent
abroad. There, they go into business for themselves and start ﬁghting with
each other. Khartoum has consciously fostered this, and the international
community has contributed to such factionalisation.
A second and related consequence is that the international engagement
drew the Darfur insurgents away from foot soldiers and the civilian
population at the local level. Thus, Abdel Wahid has been absent from
the ﬁeld in Darfur since , while Khalil Ibrahim spent extended
periods in Chad and Libya. This contributed to a rift between the
movement leaders and their ﬁeld commanders, with the result that
some of them switched over to different factions (Flint ). Moreover,
it meant that the rebel leaders were less capable to organise the
resistance at the grassroots. Indeed, contrary to the SPLM in South
Sudan, the Darfur rebels did not establish a ‘guerrilla government’ in
the form of a civilian administration consolidating the areas under their
control (Rolandsen ). This reﬂects the rebels’ military strength,
but other factors may play a role as well. Traditionally, rebel movements,
and ﬁrst and foremost the SPLM, achieved internationalisation through
‘practical humanitarianism’. This means that they established control
over certain territories and then invited international NGOs, journalists
and diplomats to these areas. The Darfur rebels did not have to do
this, as Darfur was already widely known. Insofar as they have a strategic
interest in internationalisation, it made it less crucial to establish
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territorial control and may thus have contributed to lessening the rebels’
engagement at the local level. Another consideration is that no rebel
leader has acquired the legitimacy of uniting all Darfurians, as John
Garang managed to do in South Sudan. There are also signs that the
established groups are increasingly being challenged, in particular
among young people in displaced camps (Reuters News, ..), even
if the rebel leaders still enjoy popular support, especially within their
respective tribal groups (Loeb et al. : –).
Deterrence of mass violence
The previous two propositions pertain to problematic and mostly
unintended consequences of the internationalisation of the Darfur
conﬂict. The following point is qualitatively different in that it outlines
a positive outcome related to the reduction of mass violence. Thus,
when armed conﬂict escalated in Darfur in , it went largely
unnoticed. The situation today is fundamentally different, as thousands
of international humanitarian workers and peacekeepers are present on
the ground as a result of the internationalisation that the Darfur conﬂict
has undergone since . While it is impossible to ascertain how
exactly this affected the belligerents’ behaviour on the battleﬁeld, it
seems plausible that the international attention has contributed to
deterring extreme violence in Darfur. Abuses against civilians remain
commonplace, but the government has not reverted to the mass
violence it instigated in –. Some observers have argued that this
is because the government has achieved its objective of crushing the
insurgents. However, armed groups continue to roam Darfur, and
displaced camps have become a hotbed for subversive activities against
the government. Therefore, one reason for the difference may be that
with the international spotlight shining on Darfur, using mass atrocities
as a counter-insurgency measure has become more costly. Also, the
Sri Lankan scenario, where the government moves to completely
eradicate the rebels, is difﬁcult to conceive, given the international
outcry that such action would provoke.
A similar deterrence effect may affect the insurgents. The UN
Commission of Inquiry (United Nations ) as well as human rights
organisations (e.g. Human Rights Watch : –) conﬁrmed
that rebel groups committed human rights violations and war crimes.
However, contra the propaganda of Khartoum lobbyist David Hoile
(), these abuses are in no way commensurate to those of
government-afﬁliated groups. There is also no indication that the
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Darfur rebels have systematically used mass violence against civilians as
part of their war-making effort. Indeed, the SPLA seems to have used
much more brutal methods in its war against Khartoum (e.g. Human
Rights Watch : chapter IV). Although substantiation is impossible,
it is plausible to argue that the internationalisation of the Darfur conﬂict
has played a role in discouraging them from using mass violence.
Compared with the SPLA, the Darfur rebels have been much more
exposed to the international media spotlight. While this is generally an
asset for them, it also provided grounds for criticism, which puts their
international reputation in jeopardy (Gabrielsen Jumbert : ).
For example, criticism was forthcoming when rebel ﬁghters killed ten
AU peacekeepers in Haskanita, South Darfur (e.g. New York Times
..). Not surprisingly, the ﬁghters responsible for the attack later
voluntarily surrendered to the ICC (BBC News ..). Another
example is the establishment of courts martial by JEM’s leadership
to judge ﬁghters accused of having misbehaved on the battleﬁeld
(JEM member  int.). Moreover, after being accused of using child
soldiers, JEM signed an agreement with UNICEF in July  barring
the recruitment of ﬁghters under the age of . Likewise, in April ,
JEM signed a deed of commitment banning the use of anti-personnel
mines with the NGO Geneva Call. The point here is not that these
measures were perfectly implemented, or that the rebels did not commit
some abuses. However, they are indicative of the importance the rebels
attribute to good international standing. In this context, atrocities
against civilians are less likely because they carry signiﬁcant reputational
costs.
C O N C L U S I O N
Ignored by the world at its outset, the Darfur conﬂict has become a
cause célèbre in the context of the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan
genocide in April . This article has examined the role of the Darfur
rebels in this process, and it has asked how internationalisation, once
triggered, has affected the Darfur rebellion. Our research revealed
ambiguous effects. On the one hand, when the eyes and ears of the
world are turned to a conﬂict, the rebels possess real leverage vis-à-vis the
government, and they seem to be less likely to use mass violence, for fear
of jeopardising their international reputation. On the other hand,
internationalisation encourages rebels to revert back to grandstanding
rhetoric and intransigence, banking on the help of the international
community later on in the conﬂict. International engagement also draws
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rebels away from the local level and thus fosters internal fragmentation.
The combination of these two effects partly explains the intractability
that characterises the situation in Darfur today.
In the hypersensitive debate about Darfur it is important to clarify
our argument. Thus, our research does not support Kuperman’s (:
) claim that ‘the expectation of beneﬁting from intervention is
what emboldened Darfur’s rebels to ﬁght’. To the contrary, rather than
escalating the ﬁghting, our ﬁndings suggest that the international
concern for Darfur encouraged the rebels to take their struggle away
from the battleﬁeld into the international arena. Our argument should
also not be misunderstood as questioning the legitimacy of rebellion in
Darfur or blaming individual rebel leaders for the conﬂict – the main
responsibility for both the outbreak of the conﬂict and the untenable
status quo undoubtedly lies with the Sudanese government. In any case,
this article did not tackle the question of individual responsibility, but
rather described the broader socio-political context that makes sense of
the behaviour of rebel groups.
Our study of the Darfur rebels has a number of theoretical im-
plications, which open up avenues for further research. The case of
Darfur seems to illustrate the evolution of Clapham’s () ‘inter-
national politics of insurgency’ in the era of globalisation. It is striking
how recent rebellions – the uprisings in Libya, Syria, Bahrain or the
Nuba Mountains being cases in point – have employed similar extraver-
sion strategies. Even more so than the Darfuris, today’s rebels are
cognisant from the very outset of the strategic value of projecting their
cause onto the world stage, and these efforts occupy a central space
in their struggle. The use of social media and the internet has thus
become an integral part of rebellion. This seems to point to an
important change in the way civil wars are fought. Thus, to get a more
nuanced understanding of these dynamics, it would be useful to study
other cases of globalised rebellions. Also worthwhile is the study of
globalised rebellions in a comparative perspective. This would allow
insights into why some rebel groups have been successful in attracting
international intervention, while others have failed in this endeavour.
N O T E S
. A recently edited book on Darfur (see Hassan & Ray ) includes an English translation
and a review of the Black Book by Abdullahi Osman El-Tom (), a leading member of JEM.
. The ﬁrst of over  opinion editorials on Darfur by Nicholas Kristof was published in
the New York Times on .. and entitled ‘Ethnic Cleansing Again’.
. The blog ‘Darfour: Le chef de la résistance parle’ contains eight articles by Abdel Wahid al-Nur
and is available from <http://laregledujeu.org/al-nour/> (accessed ..).
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. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this point.
. The interview with Abdel Wahid al-Nur on the online platform democast.com is available at
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OOUYmZDCmM&feature=youtube_gdata> (accessed ..).
. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this point.
. The Heidelberg Darfur Dialogue outcome document is available at <http://www.mpil.de/
shared/data/pdf/hdd_outcome_document_rev.pdf> (accessed on ..). An unofﬁcial trans-
lation of the Doha Declaration is available at <http://www.darfurinfo.org/doha-english-rough.pdf >
(accessed ..).
. The Geneva-based Small Arms Survey provides the most reliable and up-to-date overview of the
different rebel groups in Darfur, available at <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-ﬁgures-
armed-groups-darfur.php> (accessed ..).
. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this term as it relates
to the Darfur rebellion.
. Indeed, none of the policy-oriented reports, which were based on extensive ﬁeld research,
indicate the systematic use of mass violence by rebel groups (e.g. Human Rights Watch ;
International Crisis Group ; Tanner & Tubiana ).
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